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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from convictions of theft by deception, both 
second degree felonies. Utah CPfle Anru, §78-2a-3(2)(f), provides 
this Court's jurisdiction over this case. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court conduct an inadequate voir dire? 
STANDARD OP REVIEW: 
This Court reviews a trial court's performance of jury 
voir dire for abuse of discretion. State v. Ontiveros. 835 P.2d 
201, 205 (Utah App. 1992). "Whether a trial court abused its 
discretion in conducting voir dire depends on whether, 'considering 
the totality of the questioning, counsel was afforded an adequate 
opportunity to acquire the information necessary to evaluate 
[prospective jurors.]'w Id. (citation omitted; brackets by the 
Court). 
The issue was preserved by trial counsels' pre-submitted 
voir dire questions, and objection to the trial court's failures to 
ask requested questions. (R.709,710,718,719,725). 
1. Did the trial court give the jury an erroneous 
instruction? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
The Court reviews this as a question of law, for 
correctness* Ontiveros. SUETA* The court reviews "jury 
instructions in their entirety and will affirm when the jury 
instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the case." J&. (citation omitted)* 
This issue was preserved by trial counsels' objections. 
(R.1164-1171)• 
3. Did the trial court err in blocking the presentation of 
defense evidence and in denying jury instructions requested by the 
defense? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
The jury instruction aspect of this issue is reviewed for 
correction of error* Ontiveros. siUBCa- As to the evidence aspect 
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of this issue, the record must show a clear abuse of discretion. 
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994). 
The issue was preserved by trial counsels' objections to 
the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury, and by trial 
counsels' efforts to present the evidence. (R.1151-1158; 1164-
1171). 
4. Was trial counsel ineffective in failing to request 
proper defense instructions, and/or did the trial court commit 
plain error in failing to give these instructions? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
Because the trial court was not presented the issue, this 
Court must determine whether trial counsel was ineffective as a 
matter of law. Salt Lake City v. Grotespas. 874 P.2d 136,138 (Utah 
App. 1994). Review of trial counsels' performance is to be 
"'highly deferential'11 and is to avoid "'distorting effects of 
hindsight.'" I&. (citations omitted). 
In assessing ineffective assistance, this Court should 
determine whether the errors below were both obvious and harmful. 
State Yt Blflretige, 773 p.2d 29 (Utah), cert, denied, 110 s.ct. 62 
(1989). This Court has the discretion to dispense with the 
obviousness reguirement where the error was harmful in retrospect, 
but may not have been readily apparent to the trial court and 
counsel. Id-# 773 P.2d at 35 and n.7. See also State v. Verde. 
3 
770 P.2d 116,122 (Utah 1989) (applying plain error standard to 
failure to given jury instructions sua sponte). The issue was not 
raised below. 
5. Did the trial court err in its interpretation of the 
statutes governing this case, in concluding that the facts alleged 
here could constitute theft by deception? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
"The appropriate standard of review for a trial court's 
interpretation of statutory law is correction of error." State v>. 
jlamss, 819 P.2d 781,796 (Utah 1991). 
This issue was properly preserved by trial counsels' 
motions to quash the bindover orders and notions to dismiss the 
case. (R.19-60; 183-233; 560; 1052-1053). 
PJEEBBJgllATIVB CQMSTITUTIQMAL AMD STAHaSBX PROYISIQHS 
The following statutory provision may be determinative in this 
appeal: Utah Code Ann. §76-7-203. 
STATBIBHT OF THE CASB 
The State of Utah charged Tonya Vigil (hereinafter 
"defendant") with two counts of theft by deception. Kenneth Brown 
represented defendant in trial. (R.13; 175). The case was bound 
over to district court, and defendant entered a plea of not guilty 
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to all charges. (R.17; 181). Defendant moved to quash the 
bindover orders (R.19-69; 183-233; 560), and the trial court denied 
the motions- (R.82; 261; 582). 
Defendant moved to sever the two counts in the two district 
court cases. The State opposed this motion (R.252-260), and moved 
to join both cases against defendant in a trial on similar cases 
filed against defendant's husband, Thomas M. Vigil. (R.75-81; 245-
251). The trial court joined all counts and cases against both 
these defendants together for one trial. (R.261, 585-586). 
The jury convicted defendant as charged. (R.393-394; 397)* 
The trial judge sentenced defendant to serve two concurrent 
terms one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison, suspended the 
sentence and placed defendant on probation subject to a six-month 
jail term. 
From this conviction, defendant filed a timely appeal. (R.531 
and 476). 
After the notice of appeal was filed, a conflict of interest 
caused Mr. Brown to withdraw as counsel, and Mary C. Corporon now 
represents Tonya Vigil on appeal. 
STATEMENT OP FACTS 
DEFENSE CASS 
Thomas and Tonya Vigil were married and living with five 
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children in their home as of the summer of 1992. Tonya went to her 
physician for a tubal ligation and discovered she was pregnant. 
Because the Vigils were financially destitute, they decided to give 
up the expected child for adoption. The Vigils made arrangements 
to give up the unborn baby for adoption to three separate families, 
the Elizondos, the Bushmans, and the Hallidays. During the course 
of the transactions, all the prospective adoptive parents gave the 
Vigils money for expenses. The Vigils did not give up their child 
for adoption to the Elizondo couple because the Vigils had 
disagreements and difficulties with the attorney representing the 
Elizondos. The Vigils did not give up their child for adoption to 
the Bushman couple because of difficulties with Mr. Bushman, mainly 
because Mr. Bushman told them that he had decided not to adopt the 
child himself. The Vigils did not give up their child for adoption 
to the Hallidays because, after the child was born, they could not 
part with her. The Vigils kept their baby. They did not inform 
any of the couples when she was born, and did not inform any of the 
couples that they were receiving expense money from other couples. 
(R.1062-1151). 
STATE CASE 
ft\iffti»nffi 
Rex Bushman was an adoption attorney whom Tonya Vigil called 
to arrange the adoption. When the Vigils met with him in person on 
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February 28, 1993, he drafted and they signed a document indicating 
that he would find a family to adopt their baby. He asked the 
Vigils if his own family might adopt their child, and they agreed. 
He offered to pay for medical expenses and they agreed. He drafted 
and they signed an agreement for the payment of maternity expenses 
on March 5, 1995. The agreement indicated that they would return 
the expense money in the event that the adoption did not go 
through. He also drafted and they signed a form purporting to 
waive any conflict of interest stemming from his dual roles as 
their attorney and an adoptive parent. (R.754-761). 
About March 3, 1993, Mr. Vigil called Mr. Bushman twice, 
indicating the Vigils' need for living expenses of approximately 
$1,500. Mr. Bushman had agreed to pay $500 in living expenses, and 
then agreed in writing to pay them $1,000 after their consent to 
the adoption was final. Mr. Bushman wrote a check for $390 for 
their rent, and a check to Mrs. Vigil for $110. (R.761-766). 
Mr. Bushman maintained contact with the Vigils, but had 
decided not to adopt the Vigil baby. Sometime after March 19, 
1993, Mrs. Vigil told him the adoption was still on. He called 
again later and found that the telephone had been disconnected, and 
he called the police. The adoption never went through, and the 
Vigils never repaid Mr. Bushman the $500. (R.766-769). 
Mr. Bushman testified that he would not have paid the Vigils 
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$500 if he had not intended to obtain the baby. When asked if he 
considered the money a gift or charitable donation, he indicated 
that he found that idea "preposterous.11 He also testified that he 
would not have given the Vigils the $500 if he had known that other 
people were paying the Vigils in anticipation of adopting the baby. 
(R.769). 
The Blizanflpg: 
The Elizondos were attempting to adopt a child through an 
attorney named John Giffen. Thier legal contacts informed them 
that the Vigils had an interest in having them adopt their child, 
so Mr. Elizondo called Mrs. Vigil on the telephone in October of 
1992, when she was living with her mother. After further telephone 
contact with Mrs. Vigil, Mr. Elizondo arranged to pay $500 a month 
for her pregnancy expenses through Mr. Giffen's office. He paid 
$1,200 to get Mrs. Vigil into an apartment in November of 1992, and 
paid a total of $4,300. John Giffen testified the vigils received 
about $5,300. The Elizondos flew to Salt Lake City from their home 
in California to visit the Vigils in February. Mrs. Vigil told 
them the baby was due in March, and forms she filled out for Mr. 
Giffen specified March 27, 1993 as the due date. (R. 879-895; 927; 
975-976). 
Later in February, Thomas Vigil called Mr. Elizondo and asked 
him to change attorneys because Mr. Vigil was not happy with John 
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Giffen. The Vigils did not like the way the money was being 
managed, and wanted it to come directly to Mr. Vigil. John Giffen 
confirmed that Mr. Vigil had had disagreements with him because Mr. 
Vigil wanted more money and wanted the money sent to him. There 
was also a problem because Mr. Giffen's assistant did not obtain 
medication necessary to treat Mrs. Vigil. (R.889; 905-907; 914; 
918; 954-955; 958; 1010). 
Mr. Elizondo maintained contact with the Vigils in March of 
1993, until their telephone was disconnected. He later learned 
through Mr. Giffen's assistant that the Vigils had had the baby on 
March 18, 1993, and had decided to keep her. (R.895-897, 908). 
Mr. Elizondo testified that he knew that there was no 
guarantee that the adoption would go through, that he did not 
consider the money he paid to be a charitable contribution, that he 
would not have paid them had he known that others were paying them 
at the same time, and that he never got any money back from the 
Vigils. (R.897-898; 913). 
He had a civil lawsuit pending against the Vigils, which was 
filed by Paul Halliday, as of the date of trial. (R.921). 
The Hallidays; 
Paul and Vicky Halliday were working through an attorney, 
Marilyn Fineshriber, to adopt a child. Mrs. Vigil had originally 
contacted their attorney about the prospective adoption on March 3 
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or 4, and the Vigils met with the attorney on March 7 or 8, 1993. 
Mrs. Vigil said the prospective due date for the birth of the child 
was August 28, 1993. Mr. Halliday made arrangements to pay $900 in 
expenses to the Vigils on March 12, 1993, after Mrs. Vigil told the 
attorney on March 7, 1993, that the Vigils were about to be 
evicted, and another $600 on March 25 or 26, 1993, in response to 
Mr. Vigil#s call to the attorney indicating that the Vigils' 
telephone had been disconnected and that they needed money to pay 
their utilities. The receipts for the checks to the Vigils from 
the law firm state that the payments were charitable donations. 
Mrs. Vigil told the attorney on March 23, 1993, that the Vigils 
were planning to go through with the adoption. The Hallidays did 
not adopt the Vigil baby. (R.803-810; 821-836; 860; 868). 
Mr. Halliday testified that he did not consider the $1,500 a 
gift to the Vigils, that he was not repaid by the Vigils, and that 
he would not have paid the money had he known that they would not 
receive the baby or that other people were also trying to adopt the 
baby. (R.810-811). 
Mr. Halliday admitted on cross-examination that his attorney 
had informed him that the $1,500 was a charitable contribution, and 
that the money did not guarantee the adoption would go through (R. 
815). He testified that he had a civil suit pending against the 
Vigils. (R.818). 
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Mr. Vigil called the Hallidays' attorney on April 6, 1993, and 
told her that they had not intended to defraud anyone, but had 
decided to keep the baby, and would pay back the money. He also 
told her that a California couple had just offered to pay their 
expenses, and that he had made no commitment to give the child up 
for adoption. (R. 867). 
LEgAL ADVICE TQ THE VISILS 
Marilyn Fineshriber, the Hallidays' attorney, testified that 
she told the Vigils the money from the Hallidays was a charitable 
contribution, and legally could not bind their consent to the 
adoption. (R.848-849; 864). 
John Giffen, the attorney representing the Elizondos and the 
Vigils, informed all parties that the money from the Elizondos did 
not buy the consent to the adoption, but was considered a 
charitable contribution. He gave the Vigils a form detailing 
adoption-related crimes under California law, which indicated that 
it is a crime to receive pregnancy expenses with the intent to 
withhold consent to the adoption. He testified that in going over 
the form he drafted entitled "Pitfalls of Adoption" regarding 
various provisions of California law, he told the Vigils that it 
was illegal to accept money from other couples, and explained that 
Utah law is similar to California's, and counseled them about the 
vulnerable emotional state of the prospective adoptive parents. 
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(R.930-932; 992). 
Mrs. Vigil testified that John Giffen did not go over the 
forms with them, or advise them about any legal issues surrounding 
adoption, but sent his non-law-trained assistant to bring the 
Vigils the forms. (R.1121-1122). 
SUMMARY OF AROTHEHT 
A new trial is required because the voir dire in the instant 
case did not provide trial counsel with adequate information with 
which to assess the prospective jurors. The trial court's failure 
to ask the jurors about their fairness and impartiality, about 
their independence in deliberations, and about the impact of their 
exposure to media reports concerning attempted adoptions, 
constituted an abuse of discretion. 
The trial court erred in giving the jury an instruction which 
purported to carve out a theft by deception exception from the 
statute which mandates that all monies given to birth parents by 
prospective adoptive parents be charitable donations. The 
instruction was inconsistent with Utah statutes and cases, and was 
prejudicial to defendant. 
The trial court erred in blocking defendant's presentation of 
her defense evidence pertinent to her motivation in seeking out 
successive prospective adoptive couples. The court compounded the 
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error by refusing her requested defense instructions which 
elucidated her motivation for seeking out multiple prospective 
adoptive couples. 
Trial counsel and the trial court prejudiced defendant's 
defense by failing to give two jury instructions established by 
statute, which would have provided defenses to her actions. 
The trial court erred in ruling that charitable contributions 
by prospective adoptive parents can be the object of theft by 
deception charges. This Court should resolve this issue by 
ordering the case dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE INADEQUATE VOIR DIRE REQUIRES A MEW TRIAL. 
A. TRIAL COURTS MUST CONDUCT ADEQUATE VOIR DIRE. 
The state and federal constitutions require trial courts 
insure fair trials by conducting sufficient voir dire. E.g. State 
v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 448 and nn. 1-6 (Utah 1988) (citing Article 
I, sections 7, 10 and 12 of the Utah constitution, and the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution), reversed 
on other grounds, State v, Menzies, 889 p.2d 393 (Utah 1994). The 
Utah Supreme Court has exercised its supervisory power to reiterate 
to the trial courts that it is their responsibility to insure that 
voir dire proceedings not only provide adequate information for the 
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informed exercise of peremptory challenges, but also eliminate bias 
and prejudice from criminal trials. State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 
797-798 (Utah 1991). In iamss, the Court directed trial courts to 
go beyond the minimally adequate voir dire required by federal 
constitutional standards, to thoroughly detect and probe juror 
biases. !£. See also State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 844-45 (Utah 
1988); State v. Ball. 685 P.2d 1055, 1058-1061 (Utah 1984)• 
"[T]he fairness of a trial may depend on the right of counsel 
to ask voir dire questions designed to discover attitudes and 
biases, both conscious and subconscious, even though they 'would 
not have supported a challenge for cause.' All that is necessary 
for a voir dire question to be appropriate is that it allow 
' defense counsel to exercise peremptory challenges more 
intelligently.'» State v. Worthen. 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 
1988)(citation omitted). 
Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6(1) (f) codifies the right to an 
impartial jury, and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure. 18(e)(14), 
requires trial courts to conduct voir dire proceedings adequate to 
reveal juror bias. The rule provides that a juror should be 
removed for cause if voir dire indicates "that a state of mind 
exists on the part of the juror with reference to the cause, or to 
either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and 
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party 
14 
challenging[.]M 
Trial courts carry a heavy responsibility in conducting voir 
dire in criminal cases. Mu'Min v. Virginia. 114 L.Ed.2d 493, 501-
510 (1991); State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 797-98 (Utah 1991). 
B. THE VOIR DIRE IN THIS CASE WAS 
INADEQUATE. 
After the initial round of voir dire, the trial court held a 
hearing outside the jury's presence, wherein defense counsel asked 
the trial court to ask the following pre-subnitted questions: 
27. If, after hearing the evidence, you came to the 
conclusion that the prosecution had not proven the guilt 
of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and you found 
that a majority of the jurors believed the defendant was 
guilty, would you change your verdict only because you 
were in the minority? 
28. Are there any of you who are not in such a fair 
and impartial state of mind that you would not be 
satisfied to have a juror possessing your mental state 
judge the evidence if you or your loved ones were on 
trial here? In other words, would you want someone with 
your state of mind sitting as a juror on a case if you 
were the defendant? 
(R.709). The trial court declined to ask questions 27 and 28, 
because the court was of the opinion that he had already conducted 
sufficient voir dire. (R.710). 
Evaluating the "totality of the questioning," State v. 
Sherard. 818 P.2d 554, 558 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 
(Utah 1992), this Court can see that the trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to ask these two questions. The voir dire 
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never addressed whether the prospective jurors felt they were 
generally fair and impartial, or whether they would maintain their 
independence in the deliberation process, or succumb to pressure 
from a majority. 
Defense counsel also requested pre-submitted question 10, 
which stated: 
10. Have any of you see[n] any recent television 
programs, or received other information, depicting 
attempted adoptions? What did you hear? 
Counsel for co-defendant Mr. Vigil informed the court that two 
television programs concerning attempted or failed adoptions had 
aired approximately one month and one week prior to the trial. 
(R.710). He asked the court to inquire about exposure to the 
programs, and the court agreed to do so. (R.709; 710). 
Prospective juror Pepper had seen a program during the week prior 
to trial. (R.715). The trial court asked him no follow up 
questions, but he had already teen stricken for cause. 
Prospective juror Jerman had seen a show that winter. 
(R.716). When the court asked Jerman if that exposure to that 
information would prevent him from being fair and impartial, Mr. 
Jerman said that it would not. (R.716). Mr. Jerman had already 
been stricken for cause. 
Prospective juror Wylie had seen a program somewhere within 
six months prior to trial, and had read a magazine article about 
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the subject. (R.715). The colloquy was as follows: 
THE COURT: Let me ask you this question, Ms. Wylie, 
As a result of the documentary or the article in the 
magazine, and considering the nature of today's case, 
would any of that information interfere with your 
responsibility to be fair and impartial? 
MS. WYLIE: No, not really. 
THE COURT: You are certain you could remain fair and 
impartial to both sides of this case? 
MS. WYLIE: I think, yes. 
THE COURT: Obviously, you use the word "think." Do 
you have a hesitation? 
MS. WYLIE: I don't remember the story in that 
detail, you know. I think I can listen impartially. 
(R.715-716). 
Prospective juror Reese said that she had seen a show called 
"Attempted Adoption," wherein a "child was up for adoption and then 
their minds were changed and the natural parents got the child 
back." (R.717). She answered "No," when the court asked, "Would 
any of that information interfere with your abilities to be fair 
and impartial to both sides of this lawsuit?" (R.717). 
At an unrecorded bench conference prior to the parties' 
passing of the jurors for cause, defense counsel objected to the 
trial court's refusal to further interview jurors Wylie and Reese 
in chambers regarding what television programs they had seen and 
how they felt about them. (R.718, 725). Both Reese and Wylie 
served on the Vigils' jury- (R.719). (Trial counsel was under no 
obligation to remove them in order to preserve this issue. It was 
sufficient to request additional voir dire, and to obtain a ruling. 
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State v, Ontiveros. 835 P.2d 201, 204 n.l (Utah App. 1992). The 
trial court opined that the totality of the questions to all 
prospective jurors was adequate. (R.726). 
Trial counsel was correct in requesting further voir dire of 
the jurors. In State v. Boyatt. 854 P.2d 550 (Utah App.), cert. 
denied. 862 P.2d 1356 (1993), a case wherein the potential jurors 
had been victims of crimes similar to those at issue, this Court 
stated, n[T]he trial court must adequately probe a juror's 
potential bias when that juror's responses or other facts suggest 
a potential bias. The trial court does not abuse its discretion 
when, after sufficient questioning, the suggestion of bias has been 
dispelled.m Id. at 552. This holding applies here, wherein two 
of the prospective jurors had heard media reports which may have 
biased them, and state they "think" they could be unbiased. 
This Court has recognized the need for specific voir dire of 
prospective jurors in civil cases who have been exposed to similar 
media reports. In Doe v. Hafen. 772 P.2d 456 (Utah App. 1989); 
Barrett v. Peterson. 868 P.2d 96 (Utah App. 1993); and Evans Yt 
Doty- 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App.), fifiEfc. denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 
1991), this Court has explained that, once preliminary questioning 
establishes jurors have been exposed to "tort reform propaganda,91 
or media focusing on insurance reforms, prejudice* is established, 
and the parties are entitled to more specific questioning to 
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determine if jurors bear latent or deep-rooted biases as a result. 
Haffin, 772 P.2d at 458-459; Barrett, 868 P.2d at 99-101; Evang, 824 
P.2d at 464-46. Given the interests at stake in a criminal case, 
trial courts should provide at least as much voir dire as they are 
required to provide in the civil arena. See Haffin at 458 n.2 
(intimating that the scope of voir dire in criminal cases might 
need to exceed the scope of civil trial voir dire in order to 
safeguard the constitutional rights of criminal defendants). 
When the trial court found that two of the prospective jurors 
had been exposed to programs focusing on similar cases, which the 
jurors remembered, under Ha£sn Barrettr and Exans, prejudice was 
established and the trial court should have asked more specific 
questions to determine if the prospective jurors bore latent or 
deep-rooted biases regarding the issues in the case. See id. 
The trial court's perfunctory questions to prospective jurors 
Reese and Wylie about whether, in light of the media exposure, they 
felt that they could be fair and impartial, were inadequate. Juror 
Wylie never gave an unequivocal response to the trial court's 
question. Even if she had, the court should have asked more 
meaningful questions so that he and counsel could have assessed the 
impact of the media on Ms. Wylie and Ms. Reese. 
Utah law has long recognized that trial courts may not simply 
accept a juror's assessment of his or her ability to try a case 
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fairly; where preliminary voir dire raises a question about the 
juror's ability to serve, it is incumbent upon the trial court to 
ask probing questions to determine if the juror bears latent biases 
which would impair the juror's performance. See State v. Woolleyr 
810 P. 2d 440, 441 (Utah App.) , cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 
1991)(when prospective juror has been a victim of a crime similar 
to that at issue, an inference of bias arises, which is not 
rebutted by a juror's claim that he can be fair and impartial). 
Sfifi 3l££ State Vt JongS. 734 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 1987); State v. 
HfiMi£t, 689 P.2d 22, 25-27 (Utah 1984); State v. Brooks. 631 P.2d 
878, 884 (Utah 1981); Jenkins v Parrishf 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 
1981). 
As the Court stated in Evans v. Doty. 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App, 
1991), n[I]t is not enough for a trial judge to ask questions 
merely to discover a potential juror's overt biases. The judge 
must also allow counsel the opportunity to hear responses to 
questions that may indicate hidden or subconscious attitudes. 
Without such an opportunity, the prospect of impaneling a fair and 
impartial jury is diminished.n Id. at 462. 
Reviewing the totality of the questioning, this Court can see 
that trial counsel was not afforded adequate information to assess 
the prospective jurors. Because the trial court thus abused his 
discretion in conducting the voir dire, a new trial is in order. 
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See State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah App. 1992). 
POINT 2. THE ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTION 
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
A. TRIAL COURTS MUST INSTRUCT JURIES 
CORRECTLY. 
The law governing jury instructions is that "beyond the 
substantive scope, correctness and clarity of the jury 
instructions, their precise wording and specificity is left to the 
sound discretion of the trial court. However, said instructions 
must not incorrectly or misleadingly state material rules of law.19 
State Vt Sherard, 818 p.2d 554, 560 (Utah App.) cert, denied, 843 
P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
B* THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING 
DEFENDANT'S JURY. 
Trial counsel objected to the portion emphasized below in the 
trial court's jury instruction 28, (R.1170), which provides: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 28 
Under Utah law, any person, agency, or corporation 
may pay maternity expenses, related medical or hospital, 
and necessary living expenses of the mother preceding and 
during confinement. However, that act of paying is by 
law considered an act of charity and may not be made for 
the purpose of inducing the mother, parent or legal 
guardian to place the child for adoption, consent to an 
adoption, or cooperate in the completion of an adoption. 
Whether a person consents to the adoption of his or 
her child is a personal and private act of that person 
and may not be bought or bartered for under the law. A 
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natural parent at any time may choose not to consent to 
an adoption. By so choosing, that person does not 
subject himself or herself to criminal responsibility 
unless vou find from the evidence and bevond a reasonable 
doubt each and every element of the offense of Theft by 
Deception, as charged in the Information have been 
establishedt (Emphasis added). 
The problem with the emphasized portion of instruction 28 is 
that it carves out a theft by deception exception from the statute 
which mandates that all monies given by prospective adoptive 
parents to birth mothers are charitable contributions, which does 
not exist in Utah law. Utah Code Ann. §76-7-203 states: 
Any person, while having custody, care, control, or 
possession of any child, who sells, or disposes of, or 
attempts to sell or dispose of, any child for and in 
consideration of the payment of money or other thing of 
value is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
However, this section does not prohibit any person, 
agency, or corporation from paying the actual and 
reasonable legal expenses, maternity expenses, related 
medical or hospital, and necessary living expenses of the 
mother preceding and during confinement as an act of 
charity, so long as payment is not made for the purpose 
of inducing the mother, parent, or legal guardian to 
place the child for adoption, consent to an adoption, or 
cooperate in the completion of an adoption. 
There can be no theft by deception in the context of an 
adoption, because amy money given to the birth mother is a 
charitable contribution, as a matter of law, and cannot be 
consideration for a promised consent to the adoption. Utah Code 
Ann. §76-7-203. 
Reliance is an essential element of theft by deception, state 
v. Jones. 657 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1982). Even if the alleged victims 
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were deceived, there was no theft by deception unless they relied 
on the Vigils' statements in parting with their money. Id. 
Because the birth parents' consent cannot be bought under Utah Code 
Ann. §76-7-203 under any circumstances, the prospective adoptive 
parents legally could not rely on the Vigils to consent to the 
adoption. 
Birth parents cannot deceive, because the object of their 
representations, the baby, cannot be sold, and thus has no 
pecuniary significance. See Utah Code Ann. §76-6-405(2) ("Theft by 
deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as to 
matters having no pecuniary significance!;.]11). 
Any birth parent aware of Utah Code Ann. §76-7-203 would have 
a defense to a charge of theft by deception under Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-402(3), which provides, "It is a defense under this part that 
the actor: (a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property 
or service involved; or (b) Acted in the honest belief that he had 
the right to obtain or exercise control over the property or 
service as he did[.]w 
Under the plain language of Utah law, the conduct of a birth 
mother here cannot constitute theft by deception. In the event 
that the legislature wishes to make conduct similar to that alleged 
here a crime, it may do so by adopting a statute which makes it a 
crime to accept such charitable contributions if there is no 
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present intent to complete the adoption. In grafting a theft by 
deception exception into the charitable donation statute, the trial 
court invaded the province of the legislature, and violated the 
doctrine of separation of powers. See generally Sutherland, 
Statutory Construction. section 46.03 (citations omitted); 
Constitution of Utah, Article V section 1 (separation of powers 
provision). The trial court has further chilled all good faith 
efforts to care for expectant birth mothers and their good faith 
efforts to place babies for adoption. 
The last sentence of Jury Instruction 28 mistakes the law 
governing theft by deception, and the court erred in giving it to 
the jury. The instruction is the crux of the State's case, and the 
jury's receipt of it was highly prejudicial to defendant. 
POINT 3. DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO 
PRESENT HER DEFENSE IN A NEW TRIAL.. 
A. TRIAL COURTS MUST ALLOW THE 
PRESENTATION OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE. 
Every criminal defendant has a federal constitutional right to 
present a complete defense to criminal charges against her. SSfi 
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1985)("Whether rooted directly in 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the 
Compulsory Process of confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, 
the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful 
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opportunity to present a complete defense.' ... We break no new 
ground in observing that an essential component of procedural 
fairness is an opportunity to be heard.M)(citations omitted). The 
Constitution of Utah provides parallel protection. An essential 
aspect of due process guaranteed by Article I, Section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution is the fffair opportunity to submit evidence." 
Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945). "[T]he 
defendant's right to present all competent evidence in his defense 
is a right guaranteed by the due process clause of our State 
Constitution, Art. I# Sec. 7[.]" State v. Hardingr 635 P.2d 33, 34 
(Utah 1981). Article I, Section 12, of the Utah Constitution 
guarantees numerous rights to an accused. It states: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf/ to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. (Emphasis added). 
B. TRIAL COURTS MUST INSTRUCT THE JURY 
ON DEFENSE THEORIES. 
In instructing the jury, trial courts are governed by the 
requirement that "the defendant has a right to have his or her 
theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and 
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comprehensible manner." State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 205 
(Utah App. 1992)(citation omitted). 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING 
DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE. 
Trial counsel for Mr. Vigil called Roland Oliver to testify 
about services offered by adoption agencies. Upon the state's 
objection to the relevance of his testimony, both defense counsel 
argued that the evidence was relevant because, had the Vigils gone 
through adoption agencies, rather than through attorneys Bushman 
and Giffen, who provided inadequate services, the Vigils would not 
have proceeded as they did, in continuing to seek out prospective 
adoptive couples, and accepting expense monies from three different 
couples. The trial court sustained the relevance objection, and 
also excluded the evidence under Rule 403, finding that its 
admission might confuse and mislead the jury. (R.1151-1158). 
In this ruling, the trial court forbade both defendants from 
presenting their defense. The constitutional provisions prevail, 
regardless of the Rules of Evidence. The United States 
Constitution, Article VI (supremacy clause); Constitution of Utah, 
Article I, Section 26 (provisions of Utah Constitution are 
mandatory and prohibitory, unless expressly declared otherwise). 
The trial court's ruling was also erroneous under the Rules of 
Evidence. 
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Utah Rule of Evidence 402, provides for the admission of 
"[a]11 relevant evidence •.. except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state 
of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable 
in courts of this state. ..." Relevant evidence is defined by Utah 
Rule of Evidence 401, as "evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence." [emphasis added] 
Defendants' evidence regarding how adoptions should be 
conducted, in contrast to the performance of attorneys Bushman and 
Giffen, goes directly to the absence of the Vigils' intent to 
deceive anyone. By explaining proper adoption procedures through 
Mr. Oliver, defendant sought to demonstrate that the Vigils' 
behavior was caused by the inadequate performance of attorneys 
Bushman and Giffen, rather than motivated by any intent to deceive. 
The trial court's exclusion order was also based on Utah Rule 
of Evidence 403, which provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence• 
Utah law interpreting this rule demonstrates the error of the trial 
court's reasoning. Under Utah Rule of Evidence 403, courts are to 
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presume that relevant evidence is admissible unless the evidence 
has wan unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame or 
mislead the jury." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah 
1993). In the event that the evidence fell within such a class, 
the proponent of the evidence would then have the burden to show 
the unusual probative value of the evidence. 14. 
The testimony of Mr. Oliver defendants sought to introduce 
would not have an unusual propensity to "unfairly prejudice, 
inflame or mislead the jury,19 and its admission should be presumed. 
Assuming that the burden were on defendant to demonstrate the 
unusual probative value of the evidence, the burden is met. The 
State's proof of deception hinged on the fact that there were 
multiple prospective couples involved. The prosecutor told the 
jury that, had there been only one couple who tried to adopt the 
Vigil's baby, the State would not have prosecuted the Vigils. 
(R.1175; 1308). The theory of the defense was that it was the 
inadequate performance of attorneys Giffen and Bush, rather than an 
intent to deceive, that motivated that Vigils to become involved 
with multiple prospective adopting couples. (R.1297-1301). 
Evidence was presented regarding the inadequate services 
provided by Giffen and Bushman. However, the vast majority of 
this evidence required legal training to appreciate. Mr. Giffin 
vacillated in his testimony regarding whether he represented the 
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Vigils or the adoptive couple. (R.929; 941; Defendant's Exhibit 
9). He was clearly in a conflict of interest. Mr. Bushman was 
initially contacted to find an adoptive family, but he negotiating 
to adopt the Vigil baby himself, and then received documents 
authorizing him to find another couple to adopt the baby, and in 
fact negotiated with another couple to adopt the Vigil baby. 
(R.756-762; 772-783; 792). Both attorneys had the Vigils sign 
vague forms purporting to waive conflicts of interest. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 10; State's Exhibit 3). Mr. Bushman provided 
support money for the Vigils out of his attorney trust account, ami 
drafted an agreement whereby the Vigils would have to return the 
funds if they did not consent to the adoption, in clear violation 
of the law. (R.779-780). Mr. Bushman, who advertised himself as 
an adoption attorney, indicated that the idea that the money to the 
birth parents was a charitable contribution was "preposterous" thus 
showing an utter lack of knowledge of the law. (R.769-770). Mr. 
Giffen acknowledged having had difficulties with the Vigils, 
stemming from the way in which he was dispensing the funds, and 
because his assistant failed to obtain timely medical care for Mrs. 
Vigil. (R.938-939; 954). 
Had the jurors been allowed to hear about proper adoption 
procedures from Roland Oliver, this would have clarified the 
deficiencies in the attorneys' performances, which the jurors may 
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not have fully appreciated. The evidence would have supported the 
Vigils' defense that their motivation in seeking out successive 
couples was a lack of satisfaction with the attorneys, rather than 
a desire to deceive. 
The trial court's concerns that the evidence might confuse or 
mislead the jury underestimate the intelligence of juries and the 
importance of giving the jury the information relevant to deciding 
the facts. State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922 (Utah App. 1994), 
demonstrates the error in the trial court's analysis. Teuscher was 
charged with homicide for the death of a child which occurred while 
the child was in Teuscher's day care facility. At trial, her 
attorney sought to exclude evidence of other uncharged instances of 
child abuse by Teucher. This Court held that under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 404(b), proof of the other crimes was entirely 
appropriate, inasmuch as the homicide charge to be determined by 
the jury required the jury's assessment of intent and absence of 
mistake. 
In Teuscher
 r this Court held that the evidence was also 
admissible under Rule 403. While evidence of uncharged crimes is 
normally considered to be presumptively prejudicial, rstate v. 
Saunders. 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985)], this Court found that the 
probative value of the testimony outweighed the danger of 
prejudice. TCUSCher at 928. 
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The evidence at issue in Teuscher had a far greater danger of 
misleading or confusing the jury than did Mr. Oliver's testimony 
here. Unlike the prosecution in Teuscher, the defendant had 
constitutional rights to present her defense, so the admission of 
this evidence is more strongly required than in Teuscher. 
Cross-examination of the state's witnesses was inadequate to 
present the defense because Mr. Oliver's testimony went beyond the 
possible scope of cross-examination of those witnesses, and because 
defendant had the right to call witnesses for her defense. C£. 
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990)(conviction reversed for 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel in part because counsel 
failed to call witnesses to bolster the defendant's testimony). 
Because Roland Oliver's testimony was relevant, and because 
its probative value exceeded its prejudicial effect, the trial 
court should have admitted the evidence. While cross-examination 
of the State's witnesses did present evidence of the attorneys' 
shortcomings, a lay jury likely would not appreciate the 
significance of the evidence centering on legal technicalities, 
such as the serious conflicts of interest. Given the scarcity of 
other evidence available to establish the Vigils' defense to the 
intent element of the charges, the trial court's order excluding 
Roland Oliver's testimony was prejudicial. 
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D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GIVE REQUESTED DEFENSE INSTRUCTIONS. 
Over trial counsels' objection, the trial court refused to 
give the jury requested defense Instructions 8 and 9, which quote 
portions of Rules 1.7 and 1.8 of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct. (R.1169). The requested instructions were as follow: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation of that client will be directly adverse to 
another client, unless: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the 
representation will not adversely affect the 
relationship with the other client; and 
(2) each client consents after consultation. 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation of that client may be materially limited 
by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to 
a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the 
representation will not be adversely affected; 
and 
(2) the client consents after 
consultation. When representation of multiple 
clients in a single matter is undertaken, the 
consultation shall include explanation of the 
implications of the common representation and 
the advantages and risks involved. 
(R.295). 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business 
transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an 
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary 
interest adverse to a client unless: 
(1) the transaction and terms on which 
the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and 
reasonable to the client and are fully 
disclosed and transmitted in writing to the 
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client in a manner which can be reasonably 
understood by the client[;] 
(2) the client is given a reasonable 
opportunity to seek the advi[c]e of 
independent counsel in the transaction[;] and 
(3) the client consents in writing 
thereto. 
(R.296). 
Defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed on her 
theory of the defense. Requested instructions 8 and 9 would have 
assisted in elucidating the shortcomings in the performances of the 
attorneys, Giffen and Bushman, and thus in explaining why the 
Vigils sought out successive prospective adoptive couples. 
Particularly in light of the trial court's refusal to allow the 
testimony of Roland Oliver to explain acceptable norms in 
adoptions, the absence of the requested jury instructions 
pertaining to the attorneys' deficient performances was 
prejudicial. 
POINT 4. THE ABSENCE OF PROPER DEFENSE 
INSTRUCTIONS REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON TWO ASPECTS 
OF DEFENDANT'S DEFENSE. 
Since Utah law mandates that monies given to birth mothers by 
prospective adoptive parents are charitable contributions, and 
attorneys Giffen and Fineshriber advised the Vigils that the money 
from the prospective adoptive couples was legally considered to be 
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a charitable contribution, the Vigils were entitled to an 
instruction embodying the law in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402. It 
provides: 
.... (3) It is a defense under this part that the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right 
to the property or service involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he 
had the right to obtain or exercise control 
over the property or service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over 
the property or s€*rvice honestly believing 
that the owner, if present, would have 
consented• 
While John Giffen testified that he told the Vigils it was 
illegal to accept money from more than one couple, this discussion 
occurred in going over a form embodying California Law- (See 
State's Exhibit 10). Mr. Giffen testified that he told the Vigils 
that Utah law was similar to California's. Defendant denied the 
Vigils ever discussed any such legal concept with Mr. Giffen. 
The jury also should have been instructed that n[T]heft by 
deception does not occur . • • when there is only falsity as to 
matters having no pecuniary significance!;. ]" Utah Code Ann. §76-6-
405(2). 
It was the State's theory that the Vigils deceived the 
Bushmans, the Hallidays, and the Elizondos by falsely representing 
their intent to give up a baby for adoption. (R.7-8; 171-172). 
For instance, the probable cause statement originally filed in case 
number 931901605 provides: "The Defendants received money from 
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three different couples for the baby and yet never delivered the 
child to anyone." (R. 172). As a matter of law, these 
representations had no pecuniary significance. Utah Code Ann. §76-
7-203. 
B. THIS COURT SHOULD ADDRESS THE 
ERRORS. 
While trial counsel did not request these defense 
instructions, this Court should nonetheless address and rectify the 
errors, as plain error and due to ineffective assistance of 
counsel• 
Under the plain error doctrine, it is appropriate for an 
appellate court to address an issue raised for the first time on 
appeal if the error should have been obvious to the trial court and 
was prejudicial. State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert. 
denied. 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989). Some errors will be addressed on 
appeal even if they should not have been plain to the trial court, 
if, in hindsight, the appellate Court recognizes a high level of 
prejudice stemming from the error. Id., 773 P.2d at 35 and n.8. 
The plain error standard is not to be applied in an overly 
technical fashion; the rule is designed to balance the need for 
procedural regularity against the need for fairness. State v. 
Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 122 n.12 (Utah 1989). 
The two statutes at issue here should have been obvious to the 
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trial court and trial counsel. The statute limiting theft by 
deception to representations of pecuniary significance is the same 
statute which defines theft by deception. The statute setting 
forth the good faith defense to the charges is located under the 
same part of the Utah Code. The language of the statutes is plain 
and unambiguous, and directly supports the defense that both 
attorneys were attempting to assert through motions to quash the 
bindovers, to dismiss, and arguments to the jury. 
The absence of the defense instructions was prejudicial* 
There were no true defense instructions given. There is a 
substantial likelihood of a more favorable outcome, had the proper 
instructions been given. 
This Court should, therefore, address the absence of the 
instructions under the plain error doctrine. See State v. Brooksr 
868 P.2d 818, 822 (Utah App.)(discussing common standard for 
reversal on allegations of plain error and ineffective assistance 
of counsel), ££Efc- granted. 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). 
In order to bring a successful ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, a 
defendant must show [l] that trial counsel's performance 
was deficient in that it 'fell below an objective 
standard or reasonableness,' and [2] that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial. 
(at page 822). The prejudice prong is established if there is a 
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'reasonable probability' theit, but for counsel's errors, the 
result would have been different." Salt Lake City v. Grotepas. 874 
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P.2d 136, 138 (Utah App. 1994)(citation omitted). 
In considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on 
direct appeal, the record must be sufficient for this Court to 
decide the issue, and the defendant must be represented by counsel 
different from trial counsel. I£. at 822 n4. 
Just as the need for the defense instructions should have been 
obvious to the trial court, the need also should have been obvious 
to trial counsel. The failure to request the instructions cannot 
be based upon any conceivable tactical decision, and fell below 
objective standards of reasonableness. Given the absence of any 
true defense instructions, and given the evidence in this case, 
trial counsel's failure to request the instructions was clearly 
prejudicial. See State v. Moritzky. 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 
1989)(conviction reversed for ineffective assistance of counsel, 
who requested defense instruction that failed to incorporate recent 
statute beneficial to the defense; court found no conceivable 
tactical basis for the omission); Salt Lake City v. Grotepas. 874 
P.2d 136 (Utah App. 1994) (conviction reversed because trial counsel 
failed to request defense instruction authorized by the Code). 
POINT 5. AS A NATTER OF LAM, CHARITABLE 
CONTRIBUTIONS CANNOT BE THE OBJECT 
OP THEFT BY DECEPTION. 
Charitable contributions may not be the object of theft by 
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deception, as a matter of law. 
Theft by deception is defined by Utah Code Ann, §76-6-405. By 
the plain language of the statute, theft by deception does not 
occur when the matters which are the subject of the deception have 
no pecuniary significance. As noted above, under Utah Code Ann. 
§76-7-203, consent to adopt can have no pecuniary significance. 
An element of the offense of theft by deception is reliance by 
the victims. State v. Jones. 657 P.2d 1263 (Ut2ih 1982). Because 
the victims in the context of an adoption cannot rely on the birth 
parents to consent to the adoption, as a matter of law, (Utah Code 
Ann. §76-7-203), there is no reliance causing them to part with 
their money, and theft by deception cannot occur. Jones. 
The statute characterizing monies from prospective adoptive 
parents as charitable contributions, Utah CPti'3 Ann - §76-7-203, 
would also provide a basis for the statutory good faith defenses to 
theft by deception provided in Utah Code Ann- §76-6-402(3), cited 
above. 
Because the facts here cannot constitute the crime of theft by 
deception under Utah law, this Court must dismiss this case. 
POINT 6. THE STATUTORY SCHEME AS APPLIED TO 
DEFENDANT IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS. 
Defendant, pursuant to Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah State 
Constitution is entitled to due process of law. Further, pursuant 
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to the United States Constitution, the defendant is also entitled 
to due process of law. 
If a law or statutory scheme is so vague that it does not 
provide adequate notice to a citizen of prohibited conduct which 
may give rise to a criminal prosecution, then the statute is void 
for vagueness, in violation of guarantees of due process. Salt 
Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1975), cert, sign. 425 U.S. 
915 (1976). 
In this particular case, defendant is advised by one statute 
of the State of Utah that monies given to her as a birth mother in 
anticipation of adoption are a charitable contribution, and under 
no set of circumstances can bind her to the adoption. The logical 
extension of this is that no prospective adoptive parent can rely 
upon a promise to consent to an adoption. 
On the other hand, defendant has been prosecuted for theft by 
deception for receiving money under exactly these circumstances. 
This whole statutory scheme, as applied to defendant in this case, 
is void for vagueness because it does not put a citizen on notice 
adequately of potential criminal conduct. 
If the legislature wanted to make this clear it could easily 
adopt a law similar to the California statute about which defendant 
was advised making it illegal to accept money from a prospective 
adoptive parent without present intent to consent to the adoption. 
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That law does not exit in Utah, however. Since it does not, 
defendant has been prosecuted under a unconstitutionally vague 
statutes. 
Defendant requests that this case be dismissed. In the 
alternative, she seeks a new trial, wherein the voir dire is 
adequate, the jury is instructed properly, and she is allowed to 
present her full defense. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of July, 1996. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
MARY C. CORPORON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
NO ADDENDUMS NECESSARY TO THIS BRIEF. 
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in an envelope addressed to: 
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236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
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